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49-3-103(7) Utah Code Annotated 
49-3-103(2) Utah Code Annotated 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The whole case centers around the meaning of 49-3-103(7) 
of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Petitioner submits that 
since he received a promotion, which by its very nature required 
substantial overtime, there is no restriction on the overtime 
consideration in determining the Final Average Salary of the 
Petitioner for retirement purposes. This was the sole issue before 
the Utah State Retirement Board, and therefore the entire record 
before the Board was focused on this central issue. This is clearly 
and question of law, as the Board is given no deference regarding 
the same, and the issue is reviewed under a correction-of-error 
standard. Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 585; Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Services, 658 P.2d at 608; Superior Soft Water, 843 P.2d at 528, 
Dept. of Transportation vs. Personnel Review Board, 798 P.2d 761, 
(Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 49-3-103(2) provides as follows: 
(2) (a) "Compensation," "salary,Mf or "wages" means the 
total amount of payments made by an employer to an employee 
for services rendered to the employer, including: 
(i) Bonuses; 
(ii) cost-of-living adjustment; 
(iii) payment currently includable in gross 
income and that are subject to Social Security deductions, 
including any payments in excess of the maximum amount 
subject to deduction under Social Security law; and 
(iv) amounts that the employee authorizes to be 
deducted or reduced for salary deferral or other benefit 
programs authorized by federal law. 
(b) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may 
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal Revenue Code Section 
401(a)(17). 
(c) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" does not 
include: 
(i) the monetary value of remuneration paid in 
kind, such as a residence or use of equipment; 
(ii) all contributions made by an employer 
under any plan for the benefit of a participant; 
(iii) salary paid to an employee working under 
the minimum number of hours required for membership; 
(iv) salary paid to a temporary or exempt 
employee; 
(v) any payments upon termination, including 
accumulated lump-sum vacation, sick leave payments, 
or any other special payments; or 
(vi) uniform, travel, or similar allowances. 
Utah Code Annotated 49-3-103(7) provides as follows: 
(7) "Final average salary11 means the amount computed 
by averaging the highest three years of annual compensation 
preceding retirement subject to Subsections (a), (b) and (c). 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the 
percentage increase in annual compensation in any one of the 
years used may not exceed the previous year's salary by more 
than 10% plus a cost-of-living adjustment equal to the decrease 
in the purchasing power of the dollar during the previous year, 
as measured by the Consumer Price Index prepared by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides 
acceptable documentation to the board, the limitation in 
subsection (a) may be exceeded if: 
(i) the member has transferred from another 
employing unit; 
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new 
position; or 
(iii) the years used are not consecutive. 
(c) For purposes of computing the member's final 
average salary only, the member is considered to have been in 
service at his last salary rate from the date of the termination 
of employment to the date retirement becomes effective if the 
member so requests. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Utah State Retirement Board, 
involving the issue of overtime in determining "Final Average 
Salary.1' The Board placed a 13% limitation on overtime pay, 
and Appellant sumbits that that is an error, as a matter of law. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the interpretation of the law, and 
has no questions of fact at issue. The sole issue is whether 
the Petitioner's Overtime should be included in the determination 
of his retirement benefits. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was heard before the Utah State Retirement 
Board, and is appealed directly to this Court, from that Board. 
DISPOSITION OF AGENCY ACTION 
The Utah State Retirement Board ruled that the Petitioner' 
Overtime, would not be allowed beyond the ten per cent restriction 
in 49-3-103(7)(a) plus the cost of living adjustment of 
three percent, for a total of thirteen percent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner terminated his employment with 
the Utah Department of Transportation on July 30, 1994. 
Record at Page 109. 
2. Petitioner set his retirement dates as of 
August 1, 1994 and was eligible for retirement benefits 
from the Utah Retirement System as of that date. 
Record at Page 109. 
3. In September, 1993, Petitioner received a 
promotion and his base salary was increased from 
fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to 
sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56) per hour. 
Record at Page 110. 
4. Petitioner received no overtime pay between 
early 1991 and July, 1993. Record at Page 110. 
5. Associated with the promotion, Petitioner 
was required to put in substantial overtime, about one 
year before his termination of employment. Record at 
Page 110. 
6. That on or about January 5, 1990, the Utah 
Department of Transportation established a State wide 
policy on OVERTIME WORK. Record at Page 88. 
7. In the said Policy Declaration, the State 
adopted the following practice: 
!f#l. Overtime work shall be kept to an absolute 
minimum consistent with the operating needs of the 
department.fl 
"#4. Any authorized time worked in excess of 
8 hours in any one day and for work and paid leave time 
in excess of 40 hours in a week shall be classed as 
overtime (except for special cases as quoted in #2 above). 
It will be the Practice of the Department to assure 
workers of eight hours of work for each regular day. 
Supervisors will be responsible to send an employee 
home after 8 hours if an emergency situation does not 
exist." 
"#5. Overtime compensation is established for 
each class title and is identified in the Class Code Book 
as N (Fair Labor Standard Act, FLSA, non-exempt), or 
E (Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA, exempt)." 
"#6. A minimum of 40 hours per week with no 
maximum is prescribed for maintenance supervisors, and 
all Department positions grades 27 and above." 
"#7. The department will compensate those in 
grades 27 and 28 for justified overtime worked in excess 
of 50 hours in one week at the employees regular 
compensation rate." 
"#10. Supervisors will assure that employees 
will not be called to work on holidays for overtime work 
except in critical situations." 
"#11. Prior approval of all requests for overtime 
payment must be cleared in writing for overtime that 
is clearly of an emergency nature when it is not feasible 
to obtain approval." 
"#13. By administrative action, exceptions 
to the general policy on overtime may be approved under 
special and justifiable circumstances." 
"#14. When overtime is worked, consideration 
must be given so that the duration of consecutive 
work will nor impair the employeefs ability to perform 
safely." Record at Page 88. 
8. On or about April 11, 1995, Dana A. Meier, 
the District Engineer, issued the following letter: 
April 11, 1995 
To Whom it May Concern: 
In the spring of 1993, Mr. Ron Allred applied 
for and was the successful applicant for the Station 
Supervisor of Station 245 of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. In July of 1993, Mr. Allred began his 
assignment for the above noted position. 
During that time, station 245 was responsible 
for landscape throughout the district, for all the 
graffiti removal, and for the roving machanics. 
The landscape responsibilities included part 
of the multimillion dollar landscape project recently 
and for the week control and chemical spraying on the 
state right of ways. 
Mr. Allred was responsible to assure that all 
graffiti was removed from the State right of ways 
within 24 hours. His office was the graffiti "hot 
line" where all requests for graffiti removal were 
taken and then prioritized for removal. 
Because of Mr. Allred!s previous experience as 
a roving mechanic, he was assigned to supervise the 
roving mechanics in the District. 
These duties and all the other duties assigned 
to Mr. Allred during this period of time required that 
he work many hours of overtime. Mr. Allred followed 
the Department procedures of having his overtime 
approved. He did not work any more hours than what 
was required of him. 
As the maintenance Engineer for District Two, 
I was very appreciative of the great amount of work 
that Mr. Allred accomplished, as he truly was an asset 
to the Department of Transportation. 
Sincerely, 
Dana A. Meier, P.E. 
Record at Page 88. District Engineer 
9. On or about April 10, 1995, Verl k. Ahlstrom, 
the Region Two Maintenance Area Supervisor, issued 
the following letter: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCER: 
While working under my direction, Ronald H. 
Allred was in charge of all Region Two graffiti 
removal, mechanical repair to all vehicles, 
landscaping and sprikler systems. He was also 
on-call for snow removal. During this time, 
he was required to work overtime to accomplish 
the many demands of his position. At no time 
does anyone in Region Two work overtime without 
justification. In every case of overtime usage, 
written justification was and is required. 
Verl K. Ahlstrom 
Region Two Maintenance Area 
Record at Page 90. Supervisor 
10. According to the Human Resource Profile, 
Ronald H. Allred was paid a wage retroactively for 
six weeks going backwards from the date in which he was 
promoted. Record at Page 90. 
11. Ronald H. Allred1s only overtime stemmed 
from his promotion to Station Supervisor of Station 245 
of the Utah Department of Transportation. Record at 
Page 91. 
12. The Respondent applied a ten (10) percent 
limitation of the Petitioner's Overtime. Record at 
Page 110. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves a single question of law, regarding 
the Final Average Salary of the Appellant, for purposes of 
determining his retirement pay. 
The sole question is whether the Utah State Retirement 
Board will include the whole amount of overtime in the computation 
or a mere thirteen (13) per cent of the same. 
Appellant was promoted the year before he retired, and in 
the subject promotion, Appellant was required to put in 
substantial amounts of overtime. 
The Utah State Retirement Board only allowed the said thir-
teen per cent of the same, because they must be "kctuarily" "sound11, 
and to allow the overtime, would increase the benefits to the 
Retiree. 
Appellant submits that being sound actuarily is nice, and 
even preferred, but that criteria can not be a pretext for dis-
allowing the Retiree what he has earned, and what has vested in the 
Retiree through a lifetime of contributions to the system. 
The very nature of the terms, " . . . the highest three years 
of annual compensation preceding retirement . . . " suggests that the 
Utah State Retirement Board, should allow the overtime to be considere 
Moreover, when this Court reviews the provision in the 
Code defining "compensation" as being " . . . the total amount of 
payments made by an employer to an employee for services rendered 
to the employer. . ." there should be no question that "overtime" 
pay must be included in the said computation, as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ALL OF HIS 
OVERTIME CONSIDERED AS PART OF HIS FINAL AVERAGE 
SALARY. 
Petitioner submits that the center of the 
problem stems from the Respondents refusal to acknow-
ledge the fact that Petitioner had a promotion, and 
that as a direct and proximate result of the said 
promotion, he had to complete additional hours of 
overtime, which was beyond his control. 
As a result, this Court must decide whether 
the State Retirement Board has to follow what the State 
Legislature determined, or do they follow what they 
called at the hearing, "sound business practices.11 
The controlling provisions of the Utah Code 
Annotated, are found at 49-3-103, under the provisions 
entitled "Definitions." 
In subsection (7) are the specific provisions 
that are controlling here: 
(7) "Final Average Salary" Means the amount 
computed by averaging the highest three years of 
annual compensation preceding retirement subject to 
to Subsections (a), (b), and (c). 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), 
the percentage increase in annual 
compensation in any one of the years 
used may not exceed the previous year's 
salary by more than 10% plus a cost-of-
living adjustment equal to the decrease 
in the purchasing power of the dollar 
during the previous year, as measured 
by the Consumer Price Index prepared by 
the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
(b) In cakes where the employing unit 
provides acceptable documentation to 
the board, the limitation in Subsection 
(a) may be exceeded if: 
(i) the member has transferred 
from another employing unit; 
(ii) the member has been promoted 
to a new position; or 
(iii) the years used are not 
consecutive. 
(c) For purposes of computing the member's 
final average salary only, the member is 
considered to have been in service at 
his last salary rate from the date of 
termination of employment to the date 
retirement becomes effective if the 
member so requests. 
In this matter, the Petitioner, requests that 
Subsection (c) applies, and that he elects to have "his 
last salary rate from the date of termination of employ-
ment to the date retirement becomes effective." to 
be the criteria of the measurement of "Final Average 
Salary." 
Hence, instead of the Board having to determine 
the "highest three years of annual compensation 
preceding retirement" the Petitioner requests that 
retirement be based on Mhis last salary rate from 
the date of termination of employment to the date 
retirement becomes effective." 
This would be the preferred determination 
by the Petitioner. 
However, should this Court find that this 
would be inappropriate, then the Petition's fall back 
position would be the provisions of 49-3-103(7)(b)(ii). 
Under this analysis, the Petitioner qualifies 
as an exception to subsection (a) because the Petitioner 
was promoted to a new position. It is undisputed that 
the Petitioner was promoted, and he took employment 
in Salt Lake County, which required massive overtime 
beyond his control, from his prior employment in 
Sevier County. 
As a result, the limitation placed on an 
employee under subsection (a) would not apply, as 
subsection (a) states: 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), 
the percentage increase in annual compensation 
in any one of the years used may not exceed 
the previous year's salary by more than 107o 
plus cost-of-living adjustment . . . . 
Whether this Court decides that either 49-3-103 
(7) (c) applies or if 49-3-103(b)(ii) applies, it still 
must be determined if overtime should or should not 
be included. 
The State Legislature used the term "annual 
compensation11, and the State Retirement Board says 
that does not include "overtime" as it would not be 
"sound business practices" to allow those figures to 
be included. 
Petitioner submits that "annual compensation" 
is exactly what the State Legislature stated and that 
is what one was paid over the course of one year. 
The Respondent can control this figure in 
various ways: 
(1) They can petition the State Legislature, 
just like anyone else to get a clarification, except 
these folks should have sufficient clout to get the 
legislature^ attention, as the funding for this 
program would come from the same. 
In this case, the clarification must be sought 
before the Petitioner's retirement has vested, and 
not be an attempt to change the state of the law, 
retroactively. 
(2) They can draw the attention of these 
provisions to those of the State Employment admini-
strators, so as to be careful not to allow "overtime11 
during the last three jrears of employment. 
This attempt may not be realistic, because of 
the nature of "overtime." This is Petitioner's Point 
exactly. 
The "overtime" is all the more compensation 
for going beyond the call of duty. 
Here the overtime stemmed from the Petitioner 
responding to the call to assist in the management, 
where he had in times past been in the rank and file. 
The notions of management contemplates the 
best minds, and the best efforts, etc. over extended 
time, giving rise to controlling the efforts of those 
being lead. 
Surely the State Legislature intended those 
who had been promoted to reap the benefits of their 
life time efforts, and that is why they specifically 
excepted them out of the provisions of Subsection 
(a) in the Code. 
In this case no one argues with the numbers, 
or how much was earned and when. 
In this case the whole controversy centers 
around the question of does "compensation" include 
"overtime.f! 
Petitioner submits that it is not a matter 
of "sound business practices" whether he gets paid 
what he earned. 
Surely, the State Retirement Board must be 
practical and sound in the administration of the 
retirement funds for the Utah State Employees, but 
the notion of "sound business practices" can never 
be allowed as a pretense from paying out what has been 
in fact earned by the employee. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE CLAIM THAT RONALD ALLRED SPIKED HIS TIME 
IN ORDER TO INCREASE HIS RETIREMENT PACKAGE IS WITH-
OUT MERIT. 
As noted in the record beginning at page 48, 
the Respondent argues that the Petitioner spiked 
his time to make a last years run, just to increase 
his average for purposes of increasing his MFinal 
Average Salary.11 
As noted in the record at pages 101 to 106, 
this claim is wholly without merit. 
Respondent makes a big deal about the fact 
that Mr. Allred was present at the hearing in this 
matter,and that he should have testified regarding 
spiking. 
Petitioner submits that this is a bit alarming, 
as it is the Respondent making the claim of spiking, 
and therefore it is the Respondent that carries the 
burden of proof, and Respondent failed in its burden 
of proof to show any evidence whatsoever of any spiking. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
RESPONDENT SUGGEST THAT THIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE MUST LOOK AT THE WHOLE OF THE LAW ON STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, YET ATTEMPT TO HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE ONLY CONSIDER PART OF THE PUBLISHED LAW REGARDING 
THE LAW GOVERNING OVERTIME PAY. 
As noted in the Respondent Memorandum, they 
suggest that the Administrative Law Judge must look 
at the whole of 49-3-103(7) to get a full and fair 
reading of the law. 
However, they wholly failed to bring to the 
Administrative law Judge attention the Rules and 
Regulations regarding OVERTIME WORK, governing the 
Department of Transportation. 
Petitioner agrees that the Court must look 
at the whole of the subject statute to make sense of 
the same, and by the same token, this Court must 16ok 
at all of the law regarding the compensation program 
promulgated by the state of Utah, to fairly determine 
the issues before this Court. 
As a result, the Claim by the Respondent that 
there was an effort on the part of the Petitioner to 
increase his last years pay by spiking is wholly 
without merit. 
Petitioner is governed by the OVERTIME WORK, 
published Policy, and could not deviate from the same, 
even if he wanted to. 
There is no evidence that he in fact deviated 
from the established rules, and yet the statement by 
Verl K. Ahlstrom, Region Two Maintenance Area Supervisor 
is squarely on point; 
11
. . . At no time does anyone in Region Two 
work overtime without justification. In every case 
of overtime usage, written justification was and is 
required/1 
Hence, Petitioner submits that any claim by the 
Respondent that somehow he unfairly increased his 
time during the last year, is not well taken. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE STATE OF UTAH CAN FAIRLY 
AND PROSPECTIFY ADDRESS THE OVERTIME QUESTION IF IT 
CHOOSES, AND IF THE STATE DOES NOT SO REMEDY THE 
PROBLEM IN ADVANCE THE COURT CAN NOT DO THE SAME 
AFTER THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HAVE VESTED. 
Petitioner submits that what is abundantly 
clear in this matter, is that the State of Utah, can 
establish whatever they want in defining ffFinal Average 
Salary.11 
The fact that they define it in a certain fashion, 
should not result in cases such as the one at bar, 
on wholly subjective criteria, called by the Respondent, 
"actuarially sound basis." 
To define one's vested retirement as you get 
what we say i^ "actually sound" is like no definition 
at all, and makes the whole program wholly arbitrary 
and capricious. 
The matter before this Court is a determination 
of the retirement program that is vested. 
Many years of deductions are taken from the 
Retiree's paycheck, and he plans literally the balance 
of his life, based upon what should be absolutey clear 
and unequivocal, published criteria. 
Now, after all of the years that the Petitioner's 
rights have been significantly impacted, the Responent 
suggests, "Well, you get what we say is actuarially 
sound." 
One could literally end up with nothing, after 
decades of contributions, on the subjective call, 
that they get what is actuarially sound. 
What this Court must consider is the fact that 
in reality, the State of Utah, did not say you get what 
is actuarially sound, rather you get your retirement 
based on clearly established criteria, which in this 
case expressly includes the overtime efforts of the 
Petitioner in the "Final Average Salary." 
Hence, Petitioner, as a matter of law is 
entitled to the inclusion of all of his overtime in 
determining his "Final Average Salary." 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE STATE LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY INCLUDED ALL OF ONES 
OVERTIME IN THE DETERMINATION OF FINAL AVERAGE SALARY 
In 49-3-103 of the Utah Code Annotated, the 
State Legislature stated the following: 
"Final average salaryM means the amount computed 
by averaging the highest three years of annual 
compensated preceding retirement subject 
to Subsections (a),(b) and (c) . 
Then in 49-3-103(2) the State Legislature 
defines compensation: 
(2) (a) "Compensation,11 "salary,11 or "wages" 
means the total amount of payments made by 
an employer to an employee for services 
rendered to the employer, including: 
(i) bonuses; 
(ii) cost-of-living adjustments; 
(iii) amounts that the employee 
authorizes to be deducted or reduced for salary 
deferral or other benefit programs authorized 
by federal law. 
(b) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter 
may not exceed the amount allowed under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a)(17). 
(c) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" does 
not include: 
(i) the monetary value of renumeration 
paid in kind, such as a residence or use of 
equipment; 
(ii) all contributions made by an 
employer under any plan for the benefit of a 
participant; 
(iii) salary paid to an employee working 
under the minimum number of hours required for 
membership; 
(iv) salary paid to a temporary or 
exempt employee; 
(v) an> payment upon termination, 
including accumulated lump-sum vacation, 
sick leave payments, or any other special 
payments; or 
(vi) uniform, travel, or similar 
allowances. 
It is absolutely clear that if the State 
Legislature only was going to allow 10% increase in 
wage, plus cost of living increase, then they clearly 
could have put the same in the definition of compensation, 
as they not only defined what it was, but defined 
what it was not. 
Yet, no where in any of the Statutes referred 
to by the Respondent do they point out any basis 
for the claim that the State of Utkh only allows 13% 
increase over the year before. 
The State Legislature stated that compensation 
"means the total amount of payments made by an employer 
to an employee for services rendered to the employer." 
Petitioner respectfully submits that he is 
entitled to have the whole of his overtime considered 
in the "Final Average Salary" and not just some totally 
fabricated limit of 13%. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT OVERTIME MUST BE LIMITED TO 13 
PERCENT VIOLATES ALL OF THEIR STATED RULES REGARDING 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION 
It is true that 49-3-103(7)(a) provides for a 
ten percent limitation, coupled with a cost of living 
adjustment, however, that is only the case, ,fEXCEPT AS 
PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (B).ff 
Subsection (b)(ii) provides that there is 
absolutely no such limitation of increases, where 
the same is on the basis, that: 
f,The member has been promoted to a new 
position." 
Therefore subpart (a) has absolutely no 
application to this matter whatsoever. 
The statute does not say, well if the member 
has been promoted, then we will only consider up 
to 13 per cent of his overtime. 
That is found no where in the Statute, has 
no basis in the law whatsoever, and is only found 
in the Memorandum of the Respondent, under some pretext, 
"actuarially sound." 
Rather the Code explicitly states that 
compensation "means the total amount of payments made 
by an employer to an employee for services rendered 
to the employer." 
Just as Respondent argues that the whole 
statute must be considered, to make the sense of the 
program,they too must be governed by the whole of the 
statute, and the whole of the statute most clearly 
says the total amount of payments, which no mention 
whatsoever of only 13 per cent of overtime. 
To adopt the reasoning of the Respondent, one 
has to say, well compensation means one thing under 
subpart (a), but means something totally different 
under subpart (b). 
Such is not the case, the Court must consider 
the statute as a whole, and can not overlook the 
clear and unequivocal expression by the State Legislature 
that compensation, "means the total amount>of payments 
made by an employer to an employee for services 
rendered to the employer.11 
Petitioner is absolutely entitled to have 
his entire overtime pay considered in the determination 
of his "final average salary." 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF BEING "ACTUARIALLY SOUND" IS 
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BEING "ACTUARIALLY UNSOUND" 
Perhaps the best evidence of the Respondents 
position in this matter is found on page 33 of the 
transcript, wherein Mr. Anderson is asking the questions, 
and Ms. Archibald is testifying under oath: 
Q. Okay. What is your understanding of the 
purpose of the ten-percent limitation in the 
statute? 
A. We're required to operate on an actuary 
sound basis. If individuals through their 
career are not working any overtime, the actuary 
is determined for future benefits on salary. 
If we allow people to increase their salaries 
considerably in those final three years, then 
we become actuarially unsound. 
Q. So the object is to protect the financial 
basis of the system, number one; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And to have monthly retirement benefit 
that pretty much reflects that earning history 
of the member; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Petitioner submits that this claim is absolutely 
absurd, because a fair reading of the statute expressly 
states that you take the "highest three years of 
annual compensation.ff 
To suggest to this tiourt that we must be 
"actuarially sound" and any consideration of "overtime 
beyond a mere 13 percent consideration" flies in the 
face of the most clear and unequivocal language found 
in the statute, and that is the "highest three years 
of annual compensation." 
Petitioner respectfully submits that it is 
"actually unsound" to argue that we can not consider 
all of one's overtime, because if we do, then we 
will be considering all of the "total payments made 
by an employer to an employee for services rendered 
to the employer." 
When this is exactly what the State Legislature 
mandated that the Respondent do. 
Hence, Petitioner is entitled to have all of 
his overtime considered as compensation, in the 
determination of his "Final Average Salary." 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT REGARDING BEING "ACTUARY SOUND" 
ARE BETTER RESOLVED WITH THE STATE LEGISLATURE, THAN 
AN INAPPROPRIATE READING OF THE UTAH CODE BY THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
It is obvious that everyone would want the 
Utah State Retirement Board to administer the retirement 
programs in a sound and reasonable fashion. 
However, that does not mean that the Retirees 
should get whatever the Board says is sound. 
Rather, it should mean that if there is a 
problem with the definition of ftFinal Average Salary," 
then the State Legislature should define it some 
other way than !tthe total amount of payments made 
by an employer to an employee for services rendered 
to the employer." 
If the Utah State Retirement Board, does not 
want to include overtime compensation in the determina-
tion of "Final Average, Salary" then the definition of 
the same should read, "the total amount of payments 
made by any employer to an employee for services 
rendered to the employer not including overtime 
compensation." 
This is ever so easy for the State Legislature 
to do, and is clearly not something for the Court to 
read into the Statute. 
Everyone, especially the Petitioner, is big 
on being "actuary sound1'1 as his lifetime of withholding 
is based upon the retirement being there when he 
needs it. 
However, the Court can not change the rules 
after the rights have vested. 
Hence, the real remedy here, if there is a 
problem with the program being sound, is with the 
State Legislature, applying the rules across the 
board and prospectively, and not the Court's 
retroactively carving out an exception for one 
individual, after his rights have vested., 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is deciding vested rights that 
have accrued over the Course of three decades, paid 
for by the Petitioner consistently and religiously, 
every single paycheck, every single month, during 
every single year. 
Respondent would have this Court believe that 
they can pay whatever they want just so it is 
"actuarially sound.11 
Petitioner submits that if overtime should be 
excluded, then the Utah Code could be readily changed 
to so reflect, but it clearly incliides overtime; 
and it is a mere pretext, for what is clearly an 
arbitrary and capricious subjective call, to say, "Well 
we will only pay what we say is "actuarially sound11 
and nothing more.ff 
Petitioner is entitled to the benefits that 
he has earned and respectfully requests that all his 
overtime be considered compensation as outlined in the 
Statute. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Board's determination, and remand with instructions 
to include all of the Petitioner's overtime for purposes of 
determining his "final average salary." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of September, 1995. 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
to the Appellee, by mailing the same in the United States Mails, 
addressed to DANIEL D. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 560 EAST 200 
SOUTH, SUITE 230, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84102, this 20th day of 
September, 1995. 
ADDENDUM 
KEVIN A. HOWARD [4343] 
DANIEL D. ANDERSEN [5907] 
Attorney's for Respondent 
Utah State Retirement Board 
560 East 200 South, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 366-7471 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
RONALD ALLRED, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal 
memoranda submitted by both parties, the adjudicative hearing officer marks the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner terminated his employment with the Utah Department of Transportation 
on July 30,1994. 
2. Petitioner set his retirement date as of August 1,1994 and was eligible for 
retirement benefits from the Utah State Retirement System as of that date. 
3. In September, 1993, Petitioner received a promotion and his base salary was 
|Dan\AUrad2.mtn] 
1 OQ 
increased from fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to sixteen dollars and fifty six cents 
($16.56) per hour. 
4. Petitioner received no overtime pay between early 1991 and July, 1993. 
5. In July, 1993, three months prior to his promotion, and one year prior to his 
termination of employment, Petitioner began receiving substantial overtime pay. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The ten percent (10%) limitation of increase in compensation for purposes of 
computing a final average salary found in Utah Code Ann. §49-3-103(7) is not applicable to 
Petitioner's September, 1993 increase in pay from fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour 
to sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56) per hour. 
2. The ten percent (10%) limitation of increase in compensation for purposes of 
computing a final average salary referred to in Conclusion of Laws #1 is applicable to Petitioner's 
substantial overtime pay that he began to receive in July, 1993. 
3. Petitioner was entitled to a three percent (3%) cost of living adjustment and his final 
average salary computation. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Petitioner's request for board action is denied; and 
DATED this * I day /? of
^
1995
' (1 JS? J 
/ ^ / J a m e s L. Barker, Jr. 
Adjucative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
DATED this j-fa day of Jfrflg , 199 £" 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SUITE 270, 2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 467-9700 
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
------—0000O0000--—— 
DONALD ALLRED, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
--------------0000O0000 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
and 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Petitioner, Donald 
Allred, does hereby appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, all of 
the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, which was entered by the Utah 
State Retirement Board on or about June 8, 1995. 
This appeal-is made pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and in accordance with the Utah Code Annotated 63-46fe-16 
as amended in 1988. 
Dated this 7th day of July, 1995. 
JOHJT WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL and PETITION FOR 
REVIEW, to the Respondent, by mailing the same in the United States 
Mails, addressed to DANIEL D. ANDERSON, UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, 560 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 230, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84102, 
this 7th dav of Julv. 1995. 
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